Fixing Unfunded Liabilities
by Steve Puetz | November 16, 2009
PrintA major dilemma currently faces money managers, politicians, bankers, and accountants. Resolving mispriced assets and unfunded liabilities in Social Security, banking balance sheets, the mortgage giant’s balance sheets (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHA), and public & private pension funds creates major headaches for our financial leaders. The widening divergence between benefits and returns promised to future recipients and the current market-price of assets and funds has grown at an alarming rate during the past several years.
In an excellent Washington Post article, entitled Steep Losses Pose Crisis for Pensions. Two Bad Choices for Funds: Cut Benefits or Take Greater Risks to Rebuild Assets, financial writer David Cho provides details about the mushrooming problem of unfunded liabilities in the United States. The article concentrates on the pension fund industry. However, identical problems exist for a wide range of similar programs in the government and private sectors of the economy. Cho describes the problem:
“The financial crisis has blown a hole in the rosy forecasts of pension funds that cover teachers, police officers, and other government employees, casting into doubt as never before whether these public systems will be able to keep their promises to future generations of retirees. The upheaval on Wall Street has deluged public pension systems with losses that government officials and consultants increasingly say are insurmountable unless pension managers fundamentally rethink how they pay out benefits or make money or both. Within 15 years, public systems on average will have less than half the money they need to pay pension benefits, according to an analysis by Pricewaterhouse Coopers. Other analysts say funding levels could hit that low within a decade. After losing about $1 trillion in the markets, state and local governments are facing a devil's choice: Either slash retirement benefits or pursue high-return investments that come with high risk…. Before the crisis, many public pension funds had experimented with risky trading techniques or committed more of their money to hedge funds and other nontraditional firms, which in turn invested some of it in complex mortgage securities. When these melted down, pension funds got burned. Now, facing an even bigger funding gap, some systems are investing in the same securities, betting that a rebound in their value will generate huge returns. ‘The amount that needs to be made up is enormous,’ said Peter Austin, executive director of BNY Mellon Pension Services. ‘Frankly, they are forced to continue their allocation in these high-return asset classes because that's their only hope.’ Some pension experts say the funding gap has become so great that no investment strategy can close it and that taxpayers will have to cover the massive bill.” [Cho, 2009]
In essence, the need to recover losses has put pressure on pension-fund managers to increase their risk taking. Adding to this pressure, as described in last week’s letter, the Federal Reserve’s easy credit policy has created an “unintended consequence” of inadequate interest compensation for savers using money-market funds and bank deposits. Faced with this dilemma, pension managers know they have to move out of cash, but they’re unsure where to re-direct their investments. Some mavericks have moved into gold, silver, commodities, and other non-traditional investments. Other slightly more conservative managers have opted for bond market investments – incorrectly reasoning that bonds are safe. This pressure to recover losses is one of the major factors behind the bond market bubble now forming. Cho continues by describing the size of the pension funding gap:
“State and local government officials had predicted before the crisis they would have $3.6 trillion in their accounts by now, according to the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. Today, they are $1.2 trillion short of that mark…. The deficit will grow even wider, according to Kim Nicholl, the national director of PricewaterhouseCoopers public sector retirement practice. Even if public pension funds were to hit their 8 percent investment targets every year, Nicholl calculated they would have less than half of what they need by 2025. This is because a greater share of the population will be retired and those who are will live longer, thus collecting benefits longer, she said. ‘I don't think you can invest your way out of this. Plans are going to have to make changes,’ Nicholl said. ‘The scale of the losses was just so great and the liabilities are growing so fast." [Cho, 2009]
These rapidly approaching timelines will soon force administrators to adopt changes. A wide variety of options exist – with all of them being unpleasant. Cho lists the options:
“More Risk or Lower Returns. This is the dilemma confounding pension funds as they emerge from the wreckage of the financial crisis: If they shy away from riskier investments, they would be settling for lower returns that leave future shortfalls unaddressed. But by aggressively pursuing the higher rates of return they need, pension funds increase the chances they will be burned again by investment bets gone bad. ‘State pension fund directors face enormous pressure trying to recover their investment losses. It will be tempting for them to consider investments that promise a high rate of return,’ said Sue Urahn, managing director of the Pew Center on the States … The stock market, as measured by the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index, is actually down 32 percent this decade. Like many states, Maryland had begun moving money from stocks into hedge funds and private equity before the financial crisis. The goal was not only to earn a higher return but to diversify the investment portfolio. Should stocks sink, the thinking went, less traditional investments might hold up. The financial crisis offered a shocking retort. Nearly all investments, save for government bonds, tumbled at the same time.” [Cho, 2009]
Cho concludes the article by describing some other investments being made by pension funds:
“Pension funds have also been aggressively pushing into real estate and troubled mortgage securities that were crushed in the crisis. California's pension fund is putting $2 billion into buying these toxic bank assets. Financial analysts say the prices for these assets have fallen so far that they may be a better bet than in the past. But the crisis showed how unreliable these investments can be. And their prices may not yet have hit bottom. In August, California's pension fund took a similar gamble by investing $463 million in shopping centers across 17 states and the District of Columbia, though many experts forecast a prolonged slump in commercial real estate…. In Ohio … the teacher’s pension system reported that it would take 41 years for its investments to catch up with the costs of meeting its obligations to retirees. That was before the worst of the financial crisis. During the last fiscal year, Ohio's fund lost 31 percent. Its most recent annual report detailed how long it would now take for its investments to put the fund back on track. Officials simply said: Infinity.” [Cho, 2009]
In spite of what appears to be bargains, investing in commercial real estate now will likely lead to substantial losses. See Chart Monthly31 above. The stock market and commercial real estate prices both peaked together during October 2007. However, while the stock market has rallied for 7 months, real estate has continued plunging in value. More than likely, banks are dumping their toxic real estate assets onto pension funds because they know conditions are going to get much worse. And pension fund managers, in their desperate search for high-yield investments, are falling prey to the bankers’ sales pitches.
And that describes the expanding gap between what recipients expect from their pension benefits and what money managers can realistically deliver. In fact, once the bond market bubble bursts, the gap will become significantly wider – probably placing the majority of retirement funds into the “infinity to recover” timeframe. At this point, hope still exists that some type partial recovery is possible. Those hopes will be completely dashed once the next phase of the financial crisis hits.
For the most part, money managers are still counting on the Federal Reserve’s ability to inflate our way into an eternal bull market. Not recognizing that the long-term EUWS cycles turned lower in 2007, money managers are still using bull market strategies in a bear market. The current bear market rally has proved to be too seductive for managers to avoid. And, as the first section of this letter showed, money managers have moved their extra cash back into high-risk areas of the market in an “all-in” gambling fashion. Unfortunately, managers and investors have run out of cash for new purchases – meaning the markets have run out of bigger fools to push prices higher. It’s all downhill from here. Once again, money managers are being lulled into a liquidity trap – a trap that will prove more devastating than the last one.
The mentality of “pretending” that asset prices can recover to levels achieved at the height of the housing bubble can also be seen among banking executives. In an October 29 Bloomberg article, entitled U.S. Home Vacancies Rise to 18.8 Million on Defaults, Kathleen Howley described the volume of vacant homes held by banks, individuals, and investors:
“About 18.8 million homes stood empty in the U.S. during the third quarter as banks seized properties from delinquent borrowers…. [That compares to the miniscule September annual pace of new home sales reported at] 402,000, the Commerce Department said yesterday…. There were 130.3 million homes in the U.S. in the third quarter, according to the report. In addition to the 2 million empty properties for sale, the report counted 4.6 million vacant homes for rent and 4.6 million seasonal properties that are only used for part of the year. Foreclosures are included in a part of the Census Bureau that also includes vacation homes intended for year-round use and homes that are unoccupied because they are under renovation or tied up in legal proceedings. There were 7.7 million such properties empty in the first quarter, up from 7.5 million a year earlier, the report said…. U.S. banks in the second quarter held $34 billion of properties acquired through foreclosure, including repossessed homes and condominium projects gone bust, according to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. in Washington. That’s almost double the $18.9 billion of real estate [that banks held] a year earlier.” [Howley, 2009]
In addition, a few reporters have recently written about banks that have completed all pre-foreclosure procedures but then held off with the final eviction process – the rationale being that it’s better to have someone in the house somewhat watching and maintaining the property (even if they fail to make monthly mortgage payments) rather than leaving the house sit empty. This is being driven by the fact that bankers are hoping for a rebound and don’t want to sell additional properties into a weak market. Nonetheless, the delay tactics aren’t improving cash-flow at banks, and the delays fail to permanently address the issue of the true value of questionable assets held by the banks. The delays simple serve as another indicator of the “pretend things are still OK” mentality that has gripped our nation’s leaders and money managers.
Another example of the extend-and-pretend mentality can be seen by the way Wells Fargo is handling underwater loans. In a November 3 Wall Street Journal article, entitled Wells Fargo Defers Reckoning On Troubled Mortgage Balances, Marshall Eckblad describes the questionable methods used at this “too big to fail” bank:
“Wells Fargo & Co.'s strategy for modifying its billions in troubled Pick-A-Pay mortgages looks a lot like a game of kick-the-can-down-the-road. Wells Fargo, the fourth-largest U.S. bank by assets, holds more than $107 billion in debt tied to option-adjustable rate mortgages, a quintessential loan product from the housing boom that allowed borrowers to make small monthly payments in return for increasing their mortgage balance. Now, many Pick-A-Pay borrowers own homes worth far less than they owe in mortgage debt, even as many of them can afford a full monthly payment that pays down principal. To solve that conundrum, Wells Fargo is taking a gamble: The bank is issuing thousands of interest-only loans that will defer borrowers' balances for as long as six to 10 years. Wells Fargo is wagering that an eventual rise in housing prices in the country's worst-hit regions, along with a rise in consumers' income, will eventually combine to cover the bank's billions in underwater Pick-A-Pay debt. ‘We're banking on the fact the economy will improve and recover over time,’ Michael Heid, co-president of Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, said in an interview. Wells Fargo's decision to shoehorn thousands of Pick-A-Pay borrowers into long-term interest-only loans helps the bank avoid taking hefty writedowns on Pick-A-Pays that a wholesale push into foreclosures would likely produce. But the strategy will also leave Wells Fargo holding billions in mortgage debt tied to distressed properties in depressed housing markets, especially California and Florida, where the future for property values is hardly certain. Write-offs from Pick-A-Pays, therefore, could bring the bank years of burdensome costs…. ‘I suspect most of these loans will go bad,’ said Morris A. Davis, a former economist for the Federal Reserve Board who is now an urban land economics professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. ‘Borrowers have the choice of defaulting, and that's what we're going to see.’ Because of [these] troubled borrowers … Wells Fargo risks tethering itself to what former Wall Street executive David Shulman terms ‘wasting assets’ -- since borrowers facing years of negative home equity have little incentive to maintain or improve their homes.” [Eckblad, 2009]
Data from Foreclosure.com in Chart Daily16 above confirms the fact that defaults are rising (red line shows pre-foreclosure filings) while banks refrain from the final eviction process (the blue line representing foreclosures).
By relaxing accounting rules and allowing the big banks to mark their questionable assets to whatever their accountants want (instead of the market price for these assets) investors are being greatly deceived about the book values of the financial giants. Transparency issues still dominate the accounting scene. Investors in banking shares should be fully aware that these institutions mimic Ponzi schemes much greater than the Madoff scandal. The day of reckoning still awaits too-big-to-fail banks.
And it appears that investors are, in fact, re-awakening to the increasingly gloomy plight for banking companies. See Chart Daily03 on the next page, which shows the NASDAQ Bank Index. After reaching a recovery high during August, the bank index has trended lower for the past three month. In fact, the bank index is on the verge of breaking down below it July lows – which would put it within striking distance of its March 2009 low.
During the first half of 2007, the downtrend in bank shares acted as an early warning that trouble was brewing for the economy in general. Now, in late-2009, renewed weakness in bank shares provides another ominous warning about the state of the economy. Another financial crisis looms.
In the November 2 issue of USA Today, an article entitled More Walk Away from Homes, Mortgages, Stephanie Armour writes about the growing preference of underwater-homeowners to stop paying their mortgages until forced to move through foreclosure. In some cases, these strategic defaulters have been able to live in their homes for two years or more without making payments and without receiving a final eviction notice. Armour provides details about this method:
“When Sharon Sakson was laid off recently from her job as a television writer and producer, she burned through her savings to pay the $2,400 monthly mortgage on her home. But she soon decided it didn't make sense: Her home was worth thousands less than the mortgage she carried on it. The home had been appraised at $390,000 when she refinanced in 2006, but she estimates it's not worth the $320,000 it initially cost in 2004. So Sakson did what a growing number of homeowners are doing today: She stopped paying and decided to let the bank take her home. ‘I'm walking away from my house,’ says Sakson, 57, who stopped making payments about six months ago on her home in Pennington, N.J. ‘The bank can have it.’ What Sakson did is called a strategic default, or a voluntary foreclosure, and it's fast becoming a major challenge to the government's $75 billion effort to keep distressed borrowers in their homes. Walking away from a mortgage is serious business — it can knock 100 points off your credit score and make you ineligible for a new mortgage for seven years. Yet, about 588,000 borrowers walked away from homes last year, double the number in 2007… The mortgage unit of Citigroup says one in five borrowers who defaults does so willingly, even though they're able to pay the mortgage. ‘It's a very large number, and it's a very, very significant risk to the housing recovery," says Sanjiv Das, CEO of CitiMortgage. The number of borrowers who walk away is expected to increase, along with the rise in homeowners who owe more than their homes are worth. An unprecedented 16 million homeowners currently are underwater, according to Moody's Economy.com…. An even higher estimate comes from Deutsche Bank, which predicted in an August study that the number of homeowners underwater will grow from 14 million (or 27% of all homeowners with mortgages) in 2009 to 25 million homeowners, or 48% of all those with a mortgage, by the time home prices stabilize…. There also appears to be a contagion effect. Borrowers who know someone who defaulted are 82% more likely to declare their intention to do so. ‘The most disturbing aspect of this is that it's becoming acceptable to do,’ says Joel Naroff, an economist with Naroff Economic Advisors. ‘What does that mean down the road for housing and the economy if people are happy to walk away and destroy their credit? They're saying, 'Why pay a high amount if they can get something, even a rental, for less?' Because of the time and expense involved in completing a foreclosure, borrowers who decide to walk away often wind up staying in their homes for months after they stop paying their mortgage." [Armour, 2009]
This story highlights the unpleasant reality that banks now face. If they foreclose, they will be dumping more homes into markets that are already weak from over-supply. If bankers continue letting homeowners live in their mortgaged properties for free, their interest income suffers. Perplexed by this conundrum, bankers are currently frozen in their tracks – often doing nothing, and hoping that the housing market soon recovers to bail them out of their misery. This is another aspect of the extend-and-pretend mentality facing our nation.
Before the financial crisis, several authors warned about shortfalls in the Social Security system. For example, Boston College economics professor Joseph F. Quinn wrote Social Security Reform: Options for the Future, in which he described the financial challenge of the system:
"Currently anticipated Social Security revenues are inadequate to pay for the benefits promised under the current law. Therefore, some combination of revenue increases and/or benefit decreases or delays is inevitable." [Quinn, 2002]
Nonetheless, Congress remained inactive on the issue throughout the years since – never attempting to remedy the shortfall. More than likely, congressmen fear getting voted out of office by supporting legislation that either raises taxes or reduces benefits. For congressmen, it’s damned if you do, and damned if you don’t – so, indeed, nothing gets resolved and the financial wounds fester.
In 2006, Alicia Munnell and Steven Sass wrote Social Security and the Stock Market: How the Pursuit of Market Magic Shapes the System, suggesting that stock market investments could bail out the system. Fortunately, Congress avoided the stock market idea. Munnell and Sass described the deficit in these terms:
“The Social Security funding deficit is equal to 2.02 percent of taxable payrolls when measured over the traditional 75-year planning horizon and 3.70 percent when calculated from now to infinity." [Munnell & Sass, 2006]
However, these academic analyses avoid a more important issue – the unfunded portion of the Social Security Trust Fund. While the Trust Fund exists as a separate government entity in accounting terms, it essentially comingles its cash with the US Treasury. For accounting purposes, the US Treasury issues the Trust Fund a special issue IOU stating its repayment intentions. However, the important point is that the US Treasury has used all previous surpluses from Social Security to limit its own borrowing needs. Hence, for all practical purposes, the entire Social Security Trust Fund has already been spent by the US Treasury, leaving the Trust Fund completely unfunded. Of course, if a private pension fund operated in this manner, the pension managers would be sent to prison for fraud. Yet, equivalent frauds are allowed to operate under federal government management.
According to Social Security Administration data for the year ending 2008, the Trust Fund collected $805 billion in taxes; incurred $625 billion in expenditures (SS benefits plus administration costs); and ended with $2,419 billion in the Social Security Trust Fund. [SSA: Actuarial, 2009] At first glance, this paints a fairly bright picture because the $805 billion in income exceeds the $625 billion in costs by $180 billion. This is actually a government agency that operates with a surplus! However, as already mentioned, the US Treasury has spent all of the past surpluses. Additionally, the upcoming influx of retirees from the Baby Boom generation will quickly turn the surplus into a deficit within a decade. To fairly present both sides of the argument, the Social Security Administration addresses the US Treasury’s spending of Trust Fund surpluses in this manner:
“Why do some people describe the ‘special issue’ securities held by the trust funds as worthless IOUs? What is SSA's reaction to this criticism? … As stated in the answer to ‘What happens to the taxes that go into the trust funds?’… most of the money flowing into the trust funds is invested in U.S. Government securities. Because the government spends this borrowed cash, some people see the current increase in the trust fund assets as an accumulation of securities that the government will be unable to make good on in the future. Without legislation to restore long-range solvency of the trust funds, redemption of long-term securities prior to maturity would be necessary. Far from being ‘worthless IOUs,’ the investments held by the trust funds are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government. The government has always repaid Social Security, with interest.” [SSA: FAQ, 2009]
While the Social Security Administration views the full faith and credit of the US Government as unquestionable, a quick actuarial review of the government’s prior promises compared to the ability to levy taxes to pay for those promises shows that current spending patterns are completely out of control. Just for Social Security alone, the unfunded portion that still needs to be taxed to bring the Trust Fund to full funding equals approximately $16 trillion! ($800 billion in anticipated future annual expenditures multiplied by 20 years). But the Social Security problem is actually worse than stated here. Recent studies have projected deficits based on full employment statistics from the 1990s and the early part of this decade. Since the financial crisis erupted last year, the Social Security problem has intensified. The main problem now is that the workforce in the United States is contracting at a very steep rate. See Chart Monthly09 and Chart Weekly15 below.
Close examination of data from the government’s weekly and monthly unemployment reports paints a much darker picture than most economists portray. First, contrary to popular belief, total unemployment claims continue to rise (see Chart Weekly15). Recent news stories often state that declining initial and continued unemployment claims serve as a sign that the economy is recovering. Yet, including extended benefits into the claims equation (a category that didn’t exist two years ago) portrays a more accurate assessment. In fact, total claims correlate quite closely with the unemployment rate from the monthly Household Survey.
Additionally, the fact that the average length of unemployment rose to a record 27 weeks in yesterday’s report confirms that unemployed workers struggle to find a replacement job. And the rise in the U-6 index (unemployed plus under-employed workers) to a record 17.5% shows that those lucky enough to find a replacement job are doing so at drastically reduced wages and/or with part-time work.
Furthermore, for the past three months, the Household Survey has indicated that unemployment is far worse than numbers reported by the Establishment Survey. However, most economists only pay attention to the Establishment Survey. The Establishment Survey collects reliable data from larger established businesses, but it simply guesses at employment from startup companies. The Household Survey collects data from a sampling of the entire US population; however, it’s more erratic due to sampling errors. Nonetheless, over a period of several months, those errors tend to cancel, and the Household Survey numbers become quite reliable.
Most likely, the growing discrepancy between the Establishment Survey and the Household Survey reflects the fact that start-up businesses and small businesses aren’t hiring and they are terminating employees in larger numbers than Establishment Survey guesses.
The bottom line is that falling employment levels reduce tax collections for both the US Treasury and the Social Security Trust Fund. Unemployment levels are likely to remain high for years to come. And high unemployment will move the Social Security funding crisis forward many years – possibly creating a deficit in as little as 2 or 3 years from now!
The unfortunate part of this whole pretend scenario – of continually promising shareholders, pension fund holders, and Social Security recipients benefits that cannot possibly be achieved – is that the time is fast approaching when the glut of Baby Boomers will retire and expect their pension benefits. The day is fast approaching when the current blue-sky delusions will be replaced with the unpleasant truth of sharply deflated assets for making actual payments.
In summary, the tactics now being employed by our money managers, politicians, bankers, and accountants can be described as desperation methods of investment and management. Every conceivable accounting gimmick and illusionary promise is being made to convey the idea that the United States and its major institutions are financially sound. But clearly, they are loaded with unfunded and under-funded programs without plans for resolution. It appears that our leaders are projecting this illusion to prevent widespread panic.
Yet, historically, fear has been a valuable national emotion – acting as a catalyst to immediately propel our nation into needed change. During the 1930s, financial fear resulting from the Great Depression caused individuals to give up their leveraged and spendthrift ways of the Roaring ‘20s and return to the work-ethic mentality (that involved sufficient savings). It was the American work-ethic, along with limited government intervention, that propelled our nation into greatness. And after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, national fear of the military threat from Japan, Germany, and Italy forced immediate refocus of converting our industrial complex into a military machine.
A problem only gets worse by avoiding sound resolution. Suppressing the required fear needed to initiate change has allowed US debt expansion to grow so far out of control that the problem can no longer be resolved. Major waves of bankruptcies lie ahead. Government and institutional promises on a wide scale cannot be met.
If our deficit problems were properly addressed 20 years ago, maybe we could have recovered 80% to 90% of our expected benefits. However, for every year that our leaders deferred resolution, the probability of achieving expected benefits decreased. By now, collectively, we will be lucky to receive 50% of our expected benefits. And if the coming crash is as severe as I expect, we will be lucky to receive 10 cents on the dollar.
Delaying resolution of our deficits has cost us dearly. Creating financial bubbles instead of soundly resolving our financial problems only creates an illusion – and illusion that disappears once the bubble bursts. The Fed’s creation of the bond bubble, accounting gimmicks that distort banking system balance sheets, under-funded pensions, and unfunded Social Security liabilities all add to our great national delusion. Widespread financial pain will strike once these great illusions are exposed – and that time is rapidly approaching. However, then and only then (when fear overwhelms our nation’s citizens) will we finally begin seeking a reasonable long-term approach to rebuilding our economy.
References for Fixing Unfunded Liabilities.
Armour, S. [2009]. More Walk Away from Homes, Mortgages. USA Today, November 2, 2009.
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2009-11-02-voluntary-foreclosure_N.htm
BLS, [2009]. Employment Situation. Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Labor.
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.toc.htm
Cho, D. [2009]. Steep Losses Pose Crisis for Pensions. Two Bad Choices for Funds: Cut Benefits Or Take Greater Risks to Rebuild Assets. Washington Post, October 11, 2009.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/10/AR2009101002360.html
Eckblad, M. [2009]. Wells Fargo Defers Reckoning On Troubled Mortgage Balances. The Wall Street Journal,
November 3, 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20091103-709084.html
Howley, K. [2009]. U.S. Home Vacancies Rise to 18.8 Million on Defaults. Bloomberg, October 29, 2009.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aNQJ9BUq2_yM
Munnell, A.H.; Sass, S.A., [2006]. Social Security and the Stock Market: How the Pursuit of Market Magic Shapes the System. Publisher: W. E. Upjohn Institute. ISBN-10: 0880992905
Quinn, J.F. [2002]. Social Security Reform: Options for the Future. Journal of Applied Gerontology, Vol. 21, No. 2, 257-272. DOI: 10.1177/07364802021002008.
SSA: Actuarial, [2009]. Social Security Administration, Actuarial Publications, Trust Fund Data.
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4a3.html
SSA: FAQ, [2009]. Social Security Administration, Trust Fund Data, Trust Fund FAQs.
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/fundFAQ.html#n8
Copyright © 2009 Steve Puetz
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Steve Puetz | The Unified Cycle Theory | Honolulu, HI USA | Email | Website
